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Article 8

Lansing: Justice Simonett's Constitutional Wisdom

JUSTICE SIMONETT’S CONSTITUTIONAL WISDOM
Honorable Harriet Lansing†
Justice Simonett brought the power of his intellect, his
experience, and his emblematic writing style to bear on
constitutional issues in the same way that he brought these powers
to all of his inspired analysis and reflection on appellate cases and
legal doctrines.
His wide-ranging skills and talents defy easy description. But
the comments of lawyers and colleagues and the words that spill
over two hundred entries in a Westlaw “All Law Reviews, Texts &
1
Bar Journals” search provide some insight into his talent and
character: a legacy of high wit and deep wisdom, a man of letters,
an extraordinary gift for the written and spoken word, a man of
uncommon decency and dignity, a man who made us all proud to
be lawyers and judges, a man of uncommon common sense, a
judge committed to getting the law straight and making it work, a
judge who understood the whole legal structure and its effects on
people, a judge wise in the ways of people, a judge who understood
motives, a thoughtful and unfailingly courteous colleague, a highly
literate and graceful writer, a judge who used powerful analogies, a
popular speaker who recited poems with great rhetorical ability
and enthusiasm.

† Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals, 1983–2011; Senior Judge, 2011–
present. Uniform Law Commission, Executive Committee Chair (President-elect),
2012–present. B.A., 1967, Macalester College; J.D., 1970, University of Minnesota
Law School. When I was sworn in as a judge on the Minnesota Court of Appeals in
1983, John Simonett had been on the Minnesota Supreme Court for three years
and continued to serve for another eleven years. Over those years of concurrent
appellate service and beyond, I have been deeply grateful, not only for John
Simonett’s sterling example and his kind friendship, but also for lighting many a
Friday afternoon with the release of his remarkable opinions that read with the
ease of literature and applied with the precision of carefully drafted architecture.
1. A search of “Simonett” in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar
Journals” database yields 217 responses, seventeen of which refer to John’s
daughters, Judge Anne V. Simonett and Judge Martha M. Simonett. The
remaining two hundred items relate to John.
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Others described him in no less laudatory terms but with only
one or two words, saying he was intellectually generous, respectfully
curious, analytical, prudent, cerebral, fair, reasonable, gentle,
engaged, deliberate, considerate, careful, precise, cautious, warm,
wise, witty, philosophical, insightful, compassionate, kindly, and
prescient. Many characterized him as one of Minnesota’s finest
judges; a judge who understood the value of an accessible and
coherent body of legal doctrine; who knew the importance of
judicial restraint; and who, despite his stellar talents, had a sense of
humility and modesty. For someone unfamiliar with John Simonett
and his work, this composite seems like impossible hyperbole.
Doris Simonett, his spirited and accomplished wife, says John could
only have shaken his head at such praise. But lawyers and judges
who worked with John, and who relied on and applied his
opinions, staunchly maintain that this list is only a beginning.
Many of these qualities of mind and heart are richly evident in
Justice Simonett’s opinions and his reflections on the United States
and Minnesota Constitutions. Among Justice Simonett’s writings is
an article entitled, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota
2
Constitution. This article served as the lead-in to a series of articles
on the re-emergence of the Minnesota Constitution, particularly in
3
the area of individual rights. The article contains observations on
4
both the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions. As with
everything Justice Simonett wrote, it is well worth reading both for
its fundamental observations and for its enlightening excursions.
No one opinion or one article sets forth Justice Simonett’s full
thoughts on constitutions.
So our efforts to describe his
“constitutional wisdom” must necessarily be drawn from partial
analyses, comments, holdings, concurrences and dissents, or, to use
a word Justice Simonett chose in other circumstances, “excursions.”
In this Tribute, Dean Robert Stein describes Justice Simonett’s
approach to the relationship between the United States
Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution, and Randall Tietjen
provides a statistical and methodological look at Justice Simonett’s
decision making.

2. John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227 (1994).
3. Id.
4. See id. (discussing the re-emergence of state constitutions generally and
identifying considerations for interpreting and applying the Minnesota
Constitution).
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By way of overview, I want to comment on three underlying
themes or functional approaches that I discern in Justice
Simonett’s constitutional jurisprudence.
A broad word,
jurisprudence, but by that I mean to include his comments and
observations in briefs submitted to the supreme court when he was
a practicing attorney; his opinions, concurrences, and dissents
while he was on the court; and his reflective writings throughout
his professional career.
The three recurrent themes or approaches are, first, the
overarching importance of the doctrine of tripartite separation of
powers; second, his strong adherence to the principle that
constitutions should be applied with a considerable degree of
caution and only when necessary; and third, his strongly held
opinion that in developing the state constitution, “the court should
proceed prudently, fashioning its own analytical formula when
feasible, . . . not allowing rhetoric to outdistance facts,” and
creating a “distinctive, principled and credible body of state
5
constitutional doctrine.”
A few examples on each of these themes or approaches
illustrate his integrated framework on constitutional interpretation.
First, from his earliest writings as an appellate adversary, he
anchored his constitutional philosophy in what he considered “the
great distinguishing characteristic of American constitutional
6
government”: the “doctrine of tripartite separation” of powers. In
obtaining a unanimous reversal of a district court’s decision
upholding the State Board of Education’s order to withhold state
aid, he upbraided the Board for usurping “the judicial power of
7
judgment and the legislative power of creating a penalty.” The
8
doctrine of separation of powers was the “hard sense and essence”
of the issue, and no amount of “[p]atriotic generalizations and
loose talk” was acceptable “as an excuse for an executive usurpation
9
of power.” In spirited argument he reminded the court that it is
its function to guard against this behavior. He concluded that the
long and short of it is that “[t]here is no need to belabor the
obvious—that such philosophy [of ignoring the separation of

5. Id. at 242–44.
6. Brief for Appellant at 9, State ex rel. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 6, Morrison
Cnty. v. Johnson, 242 Minn. 539, 65 N.W.2d 668 (1954) (No. 36140).
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 12.
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powers] is one of anarchy. . . . [It] is the negation of government
10
by law.”
Although not quite so adamantly phrased as in his appellate
advocacy, the primacy of the separation of powers doctrine
remained a central tenet in Justice Simonett’s decision making. In
State v. Merrill, he asserted the importance of the court
remembering its role in the balance equation: “[T]he role of the
judiciary is limited to deciding whether a statute is constitutional,
not whether it is wise or prudent legislation. We do not sit as
legislators with a veto vote, but as judges deciding whether the
11
legislation, presumably constitutional, is so.” His allegiance to this
principle was based not only on the fundamental authority of the
state and federal constitutions, but also on a recognition of the
institutional competencies of each branch and the inherent value
of keeping the power equation balanced. This is evidenced by the
cautionary language in his dissent in Wegan v. Village of Lexington,
addressing the inequality of treatment between victims of accidents
involving 3.2 beer sales and sales of more potent intoxicating
liquor: “I would prefer we not disturb the Act until the legislature
has had an opportunity to enact its own corrective measures. This
12
seems preferable to piecemeal judicial legislation.” And further,
in State v. Olson, in which the court was asked to determine whether
“brain death” equated to “death” as the term was used in criminal
13
statutes, Justice Simonett, writing for the court, said:
In this instance, where the case before us does not
require that we act, where the issue raised is of profound
human interest, prudence dictates, we think, that the
legislature should first be given an opportunity to
consider the legal implications of brain death. The
legislature, with its broad based representation, its
committee hearings, and its floor debates, presents the
14
kind of public forum this issue deserves.
The second theme that Justice Simonett adhered to is the
principle that “constitutions should be applied with caution, and
15
only when necessary.” He observed in An Introduction to Essays on
the Minnesota Constitution that constitutional law concerns itself with
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 11–12.
450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990) (citations omitted).
309 N.W.2d 273, 285 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., dissenting).
435 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1989).
Id. at 535 (footnote omitted).
Simonett, supra note 2, at 231 (footnotes omitted).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss3/8

4

Lansing: Justice Simonett's Constitutional Wisdom

764

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

enduring and broadly stated principles and that many narrower
issues are better resolved by application of statutory law or
16
incremental development of the common law.
He noted with
approval that the supreme court had recently declined “to rule that
the ‘cruel or unusual’ clause of the Minnesota Constitution
17
guarantees proportionality in criminal [sentencing].”
For the
court to do otherwise would essentially “constitutionalize the
18
sentencing guidelines.”
He gave meaning to this cautionary approach in his succinct
19
concurrence in State v. French. In that case, which involved an
issue arising under the Minnesota Human Rights Act that related to
unmarried cohabitation in rental property and the violation of the
landlord’s right to the exercise of religion under the freedom of
conscience provision of the Minnesota Constitution, Justice
Simonett stated simply: “Because the issue of statutory construction
20
is dispositive here, I do not reach the constitutional questions.”
Similarly, in Bolin v. State, which dealt with an equal protection
challenge by a state trooper who wanted to run for public office,
Justice Simonett, in a dissent joined by others, said, “While it may
be unnecessarily harsh to require a trooper to pay his own moving
expenses to a new post, this item does not rise to the stature of a
21
constitutional infirmity.”
The third underlying theme or functional approach relates to
the interweaving of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions
as the court developed the state constitutional provisions. Justice
Simonett was particularly mindful of the process that the court
would employ in determining which constitution to use, the order
in which the constitutions would be applied, and the methodology
22
of the application. In An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota
23
Constitution, he pointed to two recent cases, State v. Hershberger and
24
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had initially declared a law to be unconstitutional under the
Federal Constitution only to have the United States Supreme Court
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 230.
Id. at 232.
Id. (quoting State v. Stirens, 506 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1993)).
460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J., concurring).
Id. at 11.
313 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., dissenting).
Simonett, supra note 2, at 234.
444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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25

disagree and remand for further consideration. In Hershberger II,
the court decided to apply the Minnesota Constitution’s liberty of
26
conscience provision to again find the law unconstitutional,
whereas in Cohen II, the court declined to extend the protection of
27
the free press clause beyond the federal protection.
Justice Simonett expressed concern that
the court should proceed prudently, fashioning its own
analytical formula when feasible, and not allowing
rhetoric to outdistance facts. Care should be taken in
creating precedent because any precedent in
constitutional law is perceived by the public to partake of
the enduring and fundamental character of the
constitution itself. And, finally, constitutional law and
28
common law should be kept separate . . . .
These considerations surfaced in his concurrence in
Hershberger II, when he wrote: “I join the court’s opinion. Because
this is the first occasion where our court has considered its liberty
of conscience clause in any detail, aside from the plurality opinion
29
in State v. French . . . , I should like to add an observation or two.”
And in State v. Russell, he similarly wrote,
As this court develops an equal protection analysis
under the state constitution, I find it important to develop
our analysis in a principled manner, understandable to
the legislature, the bar, and the courts. Because I share
the dissent’s concern that the court’s opinion may be
misconstrued as opening the door to substantive due
30
process, I feel I should write.
These three approaches or principles are congruent with
Justice Simonett’s intellectual qualities: analytical, careful, precise,
and cautious in building a sturdy architecture of thought on the
court’s approach to constitutional questions. These approaches
are also in harmony with his personal judicial philosophy that is
reflected in all of his opinions: a strong commitment to building an
25. Simonett, supra note 2, at 237.
26. State v. Hershberger (Hershberger II), 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990)
(holding that application of a statute requiring display of a slow-moving vehicle
emblem to Amish defendants violated their freedom of conscience rights
protected by the Minnesota Constitution).
27. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. (Cohen II), 479 N.W.2d 387, 390–91 (Minn.
1992).
28. Simonett, supra note 2, at 242–43.
29. Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 399 (citation omitted).
30. 477 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
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accessible and coherent body of legal doctrine, a careful attention
to getting the law straight and making it work, and solidly mooring
each constitutional decision within the proper boundaries of a
tripartite balance of power.
And, finally, it is important to comment not only on what
Justice Simonett did as a judge, but also the way in which he did it.
His opinions, concurrences, and dissents have been heralded for
the careful and thoughtful guidance that he provided to the district
courts, the court of appeals, his colleagues on the supreme court,
and to the practicing bar. He had a gift for not only reaching a
carefully thought-through result, but walking us through the entire
resolution to see how he got there. He did precisely what our
children’s second-grade math teachers repeatedly admonished
them to do: he showed his work. We came to understand what
approaches he considered, which he pursued, which he rejected,
and why he chose or rejected them. He provided guidance on
what the jury instructions should be when the remanded case went
back for trial. He showed us what the architecture should be going
forward. Without ever putting a thumb on the scale of fact-finding,
he would get the decision-making structure back on track and
redirected in a way that would cure a disproportionate
development in the law. He had the capacity to put doctrines,
theories, and legal tenets where they belonged and to keep them
there. He greatly respected the ingenuity and the creativity of
lawyers, but he knew that it fell to the judiciary to keep the overall
structure, particularly the common law, in proper shape and
working to accomplish principled ends.
He did this with the utmost respect to the litigants, the lawyers,
his colleagues on the supreme court, and his colleagues on the
district courts and the court of appeals. He spent no time in a
hierarchical posture admonishing “lower courts.” He did not
gratuitously disparage other reasoning processes. He created an
atmosphere of shared inquiry and the combined search for the best
answer. Although he was always clear in his own analyses, he
recognized varying paths that could lead to the same result and
accepted robust discussion and individual differences as a hallmark
of the American tradition and a valuable tradition in American law.
He often referred to James Bryce’s observation about America that
there was no country in the world that more fully applied Frederick
the Great’s principle “that everyone should be allowed to go to
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31

heaven in his own way.” Justice Simonett embodied that spirit.
His warm humanity showed a visceral understanding and
acceptance of the human condition with all of its challenges,
foibles, and aspirations.
I have always believed that in the end, it is the caliber, the
performance, and the character of the individual judges that
determine the reputation and the worthiness of a court. So I
consider myself very lucky to have begun practicing law in the
1970s when the Minnesota Supreme Court included Justices Walter
Rogosheske, Bob Sheran, Jim Otis, and Rosalie Wahl, joined in the
early ‘80s by Jeanne Coyne, Doug Amdahl, and John Simonett.
Justice Simonett was one of that great array of giants—the
Minnesota version of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, or a blend of
Holmes and Garrison Keillor: a walking version of down-home
common law for which he gladly accepted stewardship. This
stewardship for the development and the maintenance of the law
was his legacy, and we in Minnesota have been the lucky recipients
of his work. He often quoted the observation that Justice Holmes
anchored in the first paragraph of his famous book, The Common
Law, that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
32
experience.” But John Simonett seemed to have bridged that gap
with a genius for successfully melding logic and experience in a
workable structure. He believed that “[e]ach new generation of
citizens must be taught the meaning of the judicial process, how it
33
works, its justification, and its limits.” And “[t]he process insists
on a distinctive, principled and credible body of state constitutional
34
doctrine.” Justice Simonett has provided us with invaluable tools
and materials to understand and protect state and federal
constitutional doctrine and to carry on these teachings.

31. E.g., Hershberger II, 462 N.W.2d at 399 n.2 (Simonett, J., concurring)
(quoting 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 680 (1891)).
32. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
33. Simonett, supra note 2, at 243.
34. Id. at 244.
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